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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

)

)
)

RONALD ALBERT ABRAM,aka
Ronald A. Rasmussen,
Defendants-Appellant,

Case No.
12609

)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Bastardy Action brought
pursuant to the Bastardy Act 77-60-1 et. seq.
Utah Code Annotated (1953) as Amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Criminal suit was filed against Defendant-Appellant for the crime of Bastardy.
Trial by jury was held before the Honorable

-2-

Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third
Judicial District of the State of Utah, at
St. George, Washington County, State of
Utah.

Defendant-Appellant was found quilty

of the crime of Bastardy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully requests the
Court to set aside his conviction for the
crime of Bastardy on the grounds that in
light of the Uniform Act on Paternity Appellant was denied equal protection of the law
by being subjected to criminal procedures
before trial and a civil standard of proof
during trial; that sections 1, 2, and 3 of
the Bastardy Act 77-60 U.C.A. (1953) as amended have been repealed by implication by the
Uniform Act on Paternity 78-45a et. seq.
U.C.A. (1953); that evidence of prosecutrix's
opportunity to get pregnant by other men was
erroneously limited to a one month period;
and that a document purporting to prove

-3Appellant's guilt was erroneously admitted
into evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Ronald Albert Abram, Appellant, was
charged with the crime of Bastardy.

A com-

plaint was made by the prosecutrix, a summons
was issued and served, Appellant was placed
under arrest and arrangement proceedings held.
On February 12, 1971 the Respondent submitted a bill of particulars persuant to 7721-9, U.C.A. (1953).

1~

On March 2, 1971 Appel-

lants Attorney filed a motion to suppress the
introduction of a typewritten, unsigned letter

1

alleged by respondent to have been written by
the Appellant.

By order of the court dated

March 17, 1971, Appellant's motion to suppress
was overruled.
Trial by jury was held before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third
Judicial District of the State of Utah, at
St. George, Washington County, State of Utah,

~

-4on April 14,

1971~

During trial, Appellant's

attorney objected to the Court's ruling that
the period of gestation be confined to a one
month period.

Also, Appellant's attorney ob-

jected to jury instructions numbered 2, 3 and
4 upon the grounds that Appellant was being
subjected to both criminal and civil procedureE
in the same cause of action which violated the
14th amendment right of equal protection, becausE
others in his class are subject to wholly civil
procedures of the Uniform Act on Paternity, ana:
in light of the Uniform Act on Paternity, the
provisions of the Bastardy Act providing for
criminal procedures are repealed by implication
On April 15, 1971 Appellant was found
guilty of the crime of Bastardy.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

IN LIGHT OF THE MORE RECENTLY
PASSED UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
78-45a-l et. seq., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) PROSECUTION OF THE
BASTARDY ACT 77-60-1 et. seq., U.
C.A. (1953) AS AMENDED CONSTITUTES
A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOUR-

-5TEENTH AMENTIMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
A.

The right of equal protection of

Appellant was violated by subjecting him to
both criminal and civil procedures in the
same cause of action while others in his
class are subject to the wholly civil procedures of the Uniform Act on Paternity.
Therefore Appellant specifically objects to
sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Bastardy Act which
provide for criminal procedure before trial
in the complaint, warrant, arrest and bail
procedures.
77-60-1 provides:
"Arrest of father on Complaint of
mother when an unmarried female pregnant
or delivered of a child, which by law
will be deemed a bastard shall make complaint to the Justice of the Peace in
the County where she may be so pregnant
or delivered, or where the person accused
may be found, and shall accuse, u~der
oath or affirmation, the person with
being the father of such child, it shall
be the duty of such Justice to issue a
warrant against the person so accu~ed
and cause him to be brought forthwith
before him, or, in his absence, before
any other Justice of the Peace of such
County."

-677-60-2 provides:
"Binding over to District Court. Upon
appearance of the Defendant, it shall be
~he duty of the County Attorney to examine the woman under oath or affirmation
before the Justice and in the presence of
the Defendant touching the charge against
him. The Defendant shall have the right
to controvert such charge, and evidence
shall be heard as in other cases. If the
Justice shall be of the opinion that
there is probably cause to believe that
the Defendant is the father of such bastard, it shall be his duty to bind the
Defendant, with sufficient surety, to
appear before the District Court and answer such charge as in other cases. If
the Defendant shall neglect or refuse to
give bond as security as aforesaid, the
Justice shall cause him to be committed
to the jail of ti:1e County."
77-60-3 provides:
"For an information to be filed with
the District Court, of criminal proceedings."
All three of these sections were applied
to Appellant and are criminal in nature.

77-

60-1 provides for a complaint by the mother
to the Justice of the Peace with issuance of
warrant and the making of the arrest following.

77-60-2 provides that probable cause

must be shown.

77-60-3 provides that an infor

mation is to be filed in the District Court.On
the other hand, Section 78-45a-5 of the Unifor

·"

-7Act on Paternity, supra, gives the District
Court jurisdiction to determine rights and
obligations of the parties.

78-45a-2 says

that all that is necessary to start the action is for the mother, child, or agency, who
having expended money on the child, have an
action against the father, to file a Petition
with the Court alleging such paternity, and
requesting the appropriate remedy.

In other

words, the process is wholly civil in nature.
In order to have equal protection of th( ..
law, "they have to affect allike all persons
similarly situated."

u

State vs. Shondel, 23

Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 146 (1969).

Citing

McDonald D. vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
180 U.S. 311 21 S.C. 389, 45 1. ed. 542.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case oi;.'
State vs. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d
1075 (1959) at 317, stated:
"We agree that (referring to the proposition that the prosecutor shall not
be given a choice of whether to pro~eed
under a felony statute or under a misdemeanor statute under the same set of
facts) this may tend to deny to Defendant and others of his class equal

-8-

protection of the laws if the same identical facts may be used in prosecutions
under two completely integrated statutes
II

The facts in the Twitchell case did not
support that thesis.

The Court determined tha

the felony of automobile homicide was taken ou
of the old act, therefore there was no overlap·
ping of the two statutes.
is no such distinction.

In this case there
Both acts are designe

to compel a natural father to contribute towards the support of his offspring.

They both_.,

provide basically the same test, remedies, etcu
except for the process of getting into Court.
Both acts provide for support and maintenance
of the child, expenses of pregnancy, and educa
tion of the child.

77-60-7, 78-45a-5.

There is a four year statute of limi tatio,:
on back support, 77-60-15, 78-45a-3. Sections
18 to 23 of the Bastardy Act provide for blood
tests and the procedure involved is essentiall
the same as those provided for in the Uniform
Act on Paternity, 78-45a-7 to 10.

-9There are differences in the two acts,
to wit:
1.

78-25-19 limits the number of quali-

fied examiners to three (3) whereas 78-45a-8
has no limitation on the number of examiners.
2.

78-45a-8 provides that a party may

demand that other experts perform other tests;
78-25-19 is silent as to the point.
3.

78-25-22 provides that the Court may

resolve the question of paternity against the
party who will not submit to the test; the Uni-.
form Act on Paternity has no similar provision:
Admittably these differences are technical however, both acts may be invoked against
the same person upon the same set of facts,
thus the Appellant was sub,j ect to prosecution
for the same identical facts under two complet.'.
ely integrated statutes.
B.

In Griffin vs. Illinois 351 U.S. 12,

100 1. ed. 891 (1956) at 18 the Court said:
"Consequently at all stages of the
proceedings the due process and equa~
protection claus~s ~r?tect ~ers?n~ like
petitioner from 1nv1d1~us·d1scr1m1nation."

-10-

At the point of proceedings which Appellant is objecting, that is the incongruous use
of criminal procedure before trial and a civil

!

standard of proof during trial, there is a denial of equal protection.

Presecution of the Bastardy Act allows th ,
prosecutrix to go to the County attorney instead of a private attorney, as a result,
Appellant was sought out by warrant, arrested
and forced to post bail in order to stay out
of jail.

This would not have occured if Appel· :

lant were prosecuted under the Uniform Act on
Praternity.

Thus, Appellant was not treated

alike with other members of his class nor was
he protected at all stages of the proceedings
from invidious discrimination.

C.· Further, since an action to determine
paternity is civil in nature, Appellant should
not have been prosecuted under the Bastardy
Act which provided for criminal procedures to
be followed in the making of the complaint,
issuing the warrant, making the arrest and
posting bail.

-11"~he q1:1-estion is no longer an open
one in this Jurisdiction. That these
proceedings though criminal in form
are, in their nature and in the obj~ct
sought, civil, has been the settled
law in this State since the case of
State vs. Reeves, 43 Utah 447, 135 P.
270, which was followed and approved
in the case of State vs. Hammond, 46
Utah 249,148 P.420 and State vs. Anderson, 63 Utah 171, 224 P. 442, 40a
A.L.R. 94. In our opinion the foregoing cases are _conclusive upon the
questions presented by_ such assignments of error." State vs. Knight,
76 Utah 514, 290 P. 774 (1930).

The decisions of the Court have consistently declared that civil, not criminal,
rules would be followed in Bastardy proceedings.

In the case of State vs. Reeves, supra,

the question as to the quantum of proof required to establish the paternity of the child
was held by the Court to be a preponderance of
the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Again in State vs. Anderson, supra, the Court
held that the purpose of the proceedings in
the Bastardy Act was not to inflict punishment
by imprisonment, but to compel the father to

support the bastard child during the tender

-12-

years; therefore, the action was determined
to be civil in nature and not criminal. Further, in State vs. Kranendonk, supra, the
Court held that the Defendant in that case
was not entitled to a motion in arrest of
judgment because the proceedings being civil
and not criminal did not entitle him to that
motion.
In the cases cited, an issue of whether
civil or criminal procedure rules would be
utilized was involved.

In all instances, the

Civil Rules of Procedure were deemed to be
proper by the Utah Court.

Based upon the hold·

ings of the Court cited, it is clear that the
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the bastardy'
action brought against Appellant. Therefore,
Appellant was denied the right of equal protec·
tion of the law in that he was prosecuted in
a civil action under criminal rules of procedures.
The Appellant asks that he be given the
right of equal protection of the law.

The

'-13-

Court has consistently held that all persons
in a class must be treated alike.

Appellant

is not treated alike with others who are prosecuted under the Uniform Act on Paternity.
Thus Appellant was not afforded his right of

,.

equal protection when prosecuted under the
Bastardy Act; therefore, the Appellant request'.
that Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Bastardy Act,
supra, be declared violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
POINT II
THE BASTARDY ACT 77-60 SECTION
1, 2 and 3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953) AS AMENDED, HAS BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION BY THE UNFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-l
et. seq., U.C.A. (1953)
A.

The criminal procedure utilized in

the Bastardy Act is so repugnant to the new
act that those provisions become repealed by
implication.

The two acts, the Ba~tardy Act

and the Uniform Act on Paternity, are substantially the same.

The most significant

difference is the arrest and arraignment pro-

~

-14visions in the Bastardy Act.
1.

In Utah, the rule of construction is

that where there are two acts covering the same
subject matter, they will both stand, absent a ·
serious conflict.

-

In State vs. Shondel, supra,'

the Court states:
" . . . the generally recognized rule
that where there is a conflict between
two legislative acts, the latest act
will ordinarily prevail."
To be impliedly repealed, the offensive
act must have been passed by the legislature
prior to the other dCt.

The Bastardy Act was

originally passed in 1911 and has passed down
through the years in about the same form.

The

Uniform Act on Paternity was passed in 1965.
The Uniform Paternity Act, based upon the
Court's holding in Shondel, supra, prevails

over the Bastardy Act, where the provisions of .
the two acts are in conflict.
2.

In addition to the time sequence,

there must be irreconcible conflict.

The

Court stated in Glenn B. Farrell, 5 Utah 2d
439, 30 P. 2d 380 (1965):

-15"In order for a latter inactment
t? take presidence over a prior one
without expressly repealing it there
must be irreconcible conflict.' . . "
In the Glenn case the Court found that
irreconcible conflict did not exist.

The

Court relied on proper statutory construction
that requires that the Statutes be harmonized
whenever possible.

It is impossible to harm-

onize the criminal process in the Bastardy
Act with the civil process of the Uniform
Paternity Act.

The irreconcible conflict

arises from those provisions of the Bastardy
Act which provides for a complaint, warrant,
arrest, binding over and for an information
to be filed.

All of these are criminal pro-

cedures.
The Uniform Act on Paternity eliminates
criminal procedure completely.

The Court has

consistently held that Paternity proceedings
are civil.

It is impossible to interchange

these procedures between acts as they are
entirely inconsistent.

Using the criminal

procedure of the Bastardy Act would violate

-1678-45a-2 of the Uniform Act on Paternity.
Also using the procedures of the Uniform Act
on Paternity would violate 77-60-1 of the
Bastardy Act.

In each instance, suit could
-J.

not be commenced since the action was not
properly instituted.

Under these circum-

stances the Court would not have jursidiction to hear the matter.

Thus an irreconci ble :L·

conflict has arisen between the two statutes,
and pursuant to the holding in Shondel, supra,
the latter Uniform Act on Paternity prevails.

-

In addition, the criminal processes utilized in the Bastardy Act are clearly not to
be used in this type of action because had the

1

legislature wanted criminal procedures, they
could have included it in the new law. Rather,
they have adopted the Uniform Act on Paternity
supra, with its wholly civil procedures.

Thus·:

they impliedly repealed the irreconcible procedures of the Bastardy Act.

-17B.

An additional fact in support of the

,.

repeal of the Bastardy Statute is specific
statutory language.

78-45a-15 Of the Uniform

Act on Paternity, U.C.A. (1953) states:
"This act shall be so interpreted
and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
of these states which inact it. 11

,-.

Of the three other states which adopted
this act, two, Mississippi and Kentucky, have
repealed the Bastardy Act.

The Mississippi

Bastardy Act was similar to ours.

4 Miss.

Code 383 (1943) et. seq., provided for crimina
procedures prior to District Court proceedings
That act was specifically repealed by the
adoption of the Uniform Act on Paternity.

4 Miss. Code 383-01 (Supp.) (1942).

The re-

peal in the new act in Kentucky can be found
at 60. K.R.S. 406 et. seq ..

Therefore, to

effectuate the purposes of the act the legislature must have intended the Bastardy Act to
be repealed so as to be uniform throughout the
states adopting said Uniform Act.

.!

-18-

C.

In addition, 78-45a-17 of the Uniform

Act on Paternity, U.C.A. (1953) states that
"this act applies to all cases of birth out of
wedlock as defined in this act where birth
occurrs after this act takes effect."

This is.

a clear statement by the legislature that the ,

Uniform Act on Paternity should be used in all'.
cases arising after its enactment.

It shows

that the legislature intended the outdated and
needless bulk of the Bastardy Act proceedings
were to give way to the more rational approach
of the Uniform Act on Paternity.
In order to effectuate the better administration of justice, Appellant respecfully
requests this Court to declare the irreconcibl
terms of the Bastardy Act repealed by implication.
POINT

III

A TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER
WAS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WITBOUT ITS AUTHENTICITY BEING ESTABLISHED WHICH RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION.

1

-19Without respect to their admissibility,
letters and telegrams are subject to the general rules of evidence, and to various rules
relating to documentary evidence.

Baker vs.

Glennwood Mining Co., 82 Utah 100, 21P. 2d 889c
Corpus Juris 2d., Evidence Sec. 357. Proof
must be made preliminarily that the proferred
writing is authentic and that the party agains~
whom it is offered is in some way connected
with it by having written it, received it or
acted pursuant to its contents.

Murdock vs.

Farrell, 49 Utah 314, 163 P. 1102 (1907);
Anderson vs. Thomas, 108 Utah 52 (1945), 159 P
2d 142.
A.

78-25-9 U.C.A. (1953) states the man-

ner in which writings may be proved:
"Any writing may be proved either:
(1) By anyone who saw the writing
executed; or,
(2) By evidence of the genuineness of
the handwriting of the maker; or,
(3) By a subscribing witness."

c

-20-

The letter purported to have been written :
by Appellant was not
above ways.

a~thenticated

in any of tr.

There was no testimony of anyone

who saw Appellant execute the writing, the let-:
ter was typewritten and unsigned and the re-

G.

spondent did not produce a subscribing witness.
Therefore, the letter should have been exclude(
Continental Baking Co.

vs. Katz, 68 C. 2d

512~

67 Cal. Rpt. 761, 439 P. 2d 889.

2.

A proper foundation must be laid for

the admission of documentary evidence, that isC·
the identity and authenticity of the document
must be reasonably established as a pre-requisi te to its admission into evidence.

Jones

on Evidence, Vol. 3 pg. 1044.
The only evidence offered to prove that
Appellant wrote the subject letter is a smudge
post-mark and an accusation that the letter
contained information that only the Appellant
could have known.

"!

-21-

In 9 A.L.R. 984, it is stated that the
authorities generally concede that under proper facts and circumstances the

aut~enticity

or genuineness of a letter may be established

by indirect or circumstantial evidence, without.!
resort to proof of handwriting or typewriting.
Among other things upon which reliance may be

placed is that a letter states facts which coul.1

'

I

only be known to or relate to the purported
writer.

This rule requires a showing of informatic:
contained in the letter which would only have
been known to the author.
such showing.

''

Respondent made no

The letter contains information

'r

known to both the prosecutrix and the Appellan· ~
thus, authentication was not accomplished.

,I

!

Further, the post-mark on the letter was ·t
smudged, not legible.

i

Alone, the post-mark ev!I

if legible would not be suffifient to authen- _!
ticate the document.

Reynolds vs. Hinricks,

16 S.D. 602, 94N.W. 644- Jones on Evidence,

t
: ~

pg. 1205.
"

-22Therefore, the letter was improperly
admitted into evidence.

3.

Admitting the letter into evidence

and allowing the jury to take it into the
jury room for reference and analipis was prejudicial error.

In Joseph vs. Groves Latter-

day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P. 2d
q~5,

the court held:
"The burden is upon the appellant
not only to show that there was error,
but that it was prejudicial to the extent that there is reasonable likelihood that in its.absence there would
have been a aifferent result."
In the Joseph case, supra, the court four

error but reuled it was harmless error.

Admit-

ting the letter into evidence was not harmless
error.

1

The letter states that its author is

the child's father.

When allowed into evidence

it was an admission by the author of his guilt

and by admitting it as evidence Appellant was
deemed the author. The letter was enough standing alone to convict the Appellant.
If the letter had not been admitted, AppE
lant would not have been convicted.

The only

,.

-23testimony which accused Appellant of being the·
father was that of the prosecutrix.

In addi- ,

tion, the evidence is contradictory as to
whether Appellant was with prosecutrix during:
the period of gestation,

as it was proved by

Appellant that he was attending school some
316 miles from the home of prosecutrix. Also
Appellant established that during the period
of gestation, prosecutrix had opportunity to
be with men who might have fathered her child.·
Therefore, Appellant would not have been
convicted if the letter had not been admitted
into evidence.

Therefore, Appellant respectfully request 1:
the court to dismiss his conviction since the

'

admission into evidence of the letter was improper and resulted in prejudicial error and
in his conviction.

POINT

IV

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH SHOWED
THAT PROSECUTRIX HAD AN OPPORTUNITY
TO HAVE SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH MEN
OTHER THAN APPELLANT EXCEPT FOR A

_J

-24ONE MONTH PERIOD WAS ERRONIOUS
AND PREJUTIICIAL ERROR RESULTED.
A.

Evidence of prosecutrix's sexual rela-

tions with men other than Appellant during the
period of conception is permissible.
"In paternity proceedings, refusal
to permit plaintiff to be asked when
testifying as an adverse witnes~ under
the code of civil procedure, whether
she had sexual relations with other men
during period of which she conceived,
was error. croset vs. Page, 147 C.A.
2d 385, 305 P. 2d 121.
In the Croset case the court found that
conception took place on the night of June 14,
1952.

Nevertheless, the court found that evi-

dence of sexual relations of prosecutrix with
men other than Appellant should have been admitted for the period in which prosecutrix
could have become pregnant.

The court in the

present case limited the period of time for
which such evidence may be introduced to one
month, October 15, to November 15.
the holding in the Croset

Based upon

case, the court

should have allowed such evidence for a period
in which conception may have taken place.

The

,,
!

-25court in the Croset case found that period to .
be two months.
Appellant has the right but not the burdE
of showing that prosecutrix had such relationc
with other men during or about the time when i,
the ordinary course of nature the child must
have been received.

Berry vs. Chaplin, 169 P.

2d 442 (1942)
In the Berry case, supra, the court found.:

I

the period of gestation to be two months.
The period of gestation is that period in
which presecutrix can conceive.

The only

test1~
j

imony establishing the period of gestation is
that of the doctor and the prosecutrix.
doctor's opinion is based upon the

'I

11

~

I

The

prosecutrix~

statement to him of the date of her last perio j
1

~

Therefore, the doctor was relying upon prosecu·::
trix's opinion of when she was able to get
nant.

prei~~

Obviously, prosecutrix's will pick the ~

date that collaborates her complaint.
In light of the Croset and Chaplin cases,
a period of two months would be reasonable.

,,

~

,"

-26Further, testimony other than prosecutrix's as
to the period of gestation is lacking.

In viev

of the above, the trial court was not correct
in limiting the period of gestation to one
month.
B.

The exclusion of evidence showing

that prosecutrix had sexual intercourse within

the period of gestation with other men was prejudicial error.

The Joseph case, supra, requires that a1
error to be prejudicial must be such that if
it had not been committed defendant would not
have been convicted.

If Appellant had been

allowed to inquire beyond the one month period:
he would have introduced evidence tending to
establish that prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with other men in November and in October and late September.

The introduction of

this evidence would have required that prosecutrix bear a greater burden in proving that
Appellant was in fact the father, which burden

-27plaintiff did not bear.

Therefore, the exclu-

sion of such evidence was prejudicial error.
Appellant requests the court to dismiss
his conviction because the trial court erroniously excluded evidence which would have
prevented his conviction.

-28-

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests the
Court to reverse the lower court on the
following grounds:
1.

That appellant was denied his right

of equal protection of the laws in that he
was subject to both criminal and civil procedure rules while others in his class are
subject to the

who~ly

civil procedures of the

Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a-l et. seq.,
U.C.A. (1953).
2.

That sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Bas-

tardy Act 77-60, U.C.A~ (1953) as amended
have been repealed by implication by the Uniform Act on Paternity 78-45a-l et. seq.,
U.C.A. (1953).
3.

That evidence tending to prove that

prosecutrix had sexual relations with other
men during the period of gestation was

-29errorneously excluded by the lower court.

4.

That a letter alleged by respondent

to have been written by the Appellant and
admitting the authori's guilt was erroneously
admitted into evidenceo

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
DARWIN C. FISHER
PICKETT BUILDING
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

